From Fedora Project Wiki
m (No, this fixes it)
m (Minor restructure)
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<!--Todo:
 
<!--Todo:
 +
• Top priority: "insmod" is forbidden under secure boot even when applied to a module in grubx64.efi. This must be resolved or change is worthless
 
• Triple faults occur on VMware Workstation platform, but not on bare-metal. Cause unknown. Investigate using debug=all and try with check_signatures=no
 
• Triple faults occur on VMware Workstation platform, but not on bare-metal. Cause unknown. Investigate using debug=all and try with check_signatures=no
 +
• Should other modules be included to allow use of other algorithms? (Unnecessary in the proposed long-term plan)
 +
• Pull request - should sort out matter of change owner
 
• Add instructions to ensure future signing of files (kernel postinstall and maybe rpm postinstall (if next point doesn't cover it already through a rpm postinstall hook to grub scripts)) to "Detailed Description" and "How to Test"
 
• Add instructions to ensure future signing of files (kernel postinstall and maybe rpm postinstall (if next point doesn't cover it already through a rpm postinstall hook to grub scripts)) to "Detailed Description" and "How to Test"
 
• Review "Detailed Description" for functionality that can be presently implemented
 
• Review "Detailed Description" for functionality that can be presently implemented
• Has change now become system-wide?
+
• Has change now become system-wide?-->
• Should other modules be included to allow use of other algorithms? (Unnecessary in the proposed long-term plan)
 
• Improve formatting of terminal commands
 
• Pull request - should sort out matter of change owner-->
 
 
<!-- Self Contained or System Wide Change Proposal?
 
<!-- Self Contained or System Wide Change Proposal?
 
Use this guide to determine to which category your proposed change belongs to.
 
Use this guide to determine to which category your proposed change belongs to.
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Include Grub's "verify," "cryptodisk" and "luks" modules in grubx64.efi of the 'grub2-efi-x64' package.
 
Include Grub's "verify," "cryptodisk" and "luks" modules in grubx64.efi of the 'grub2-efi-x64' package.
  
Note: The dependencies "gcry_rijndael," "gcry_sha256," "procfs," "archelp," "mpi," "gcry_rsa" and "gcry_sha1" must also be included.
+
 
 +
Note: The following dependencies must also be included:
 +
 
 +
Explicit: "mpi," "gcry_sha1," "procfs" and "archelp"
 +
 
 +
Implicit: "gcry_sha256," "gcry_rsa" and "gcry_rijndael"
  
 
== Owner ==
 
== Owner ==
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This should link to your home wiki page so we know who you are.  
 
This should link to your home wiki page so we know who you are.  
 
-->
 
-->
* Name: [[User:benjamind| Benjamin]]
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* Name: [[User:benjamind| Benjamin Doron]]
 
<!-- Include your email address that you can be reached should people want to contact you about helping with your change, status is requested, or technical issues need to be resolved. If the change proposal is owned by a SIG, please also add a primary contact person. -->
 
<!-- Include your email address that you can be reached should people want to contact you about helping with your change, status is requested, or technical issues need to be resolved. If the change proposal is owned by a SIG, please also add a primary contact person. -->
 
* Email: benjamin.doron00@gmail.com
 
* Email: benjamin.doron00@gmail.com
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== Detailed Description ==
 
== Detailed Description ==
 
<!-- Expand on the summary, if appropriate.  A couple sentences suffices to explain the goal, but the more details you can provide the better. -->
 
<!-- Expand on the summary, if appropriate.  A couple sentences suffices to explain the goal, but the more details you can provide the better. -->
Users utilising secure boot functionality on the UEFI platform cannot insert modules that aren't in grubx64.efi. Paradoxically, this means that security-conscious users cannot use grub's verify module, or employ (near) full disk encryption using cryptodisk and luks.
+
Users utilising secure boot functionality on the UEFI platform cannot insert grub modules. Paradoxically, this means that security-conscious users cannot use grub's verify module, or employ (near) full disk encryption using cryptodisk and luks.
  
 
The security benefits of signature verification would reach more users if Fedora automated it by incorporating the process into grub2-mkconfig. Similarly, it would be easier to use cryptodisk functionality if it were configurable by anaconda.
 
The security benefits of signature verification would reach more users if Fedora automated it by incorporating the process into grub2-mkconfig. Similarly, it would be easier to use cryptodisk functionality if it were configurable by anaconda.
  
For the long-term, to grant flexibility with grub2 modules on secure boot instances, it may be advisable to sign the .mod files in the 'grub2-efi-x64-modules' package, modify grub2-mkconfig (or -install) to copy the necessary modules into the EFI partition when required by the user's configuration and then allow inserting of signed modules in secure boot instances.
+
For the long-term, to grant flexibility with grub2 modules on secure boot instances, it may be advisable to sign the .mod files in the 'grub2-efi-x64-modules' package, allow inserting of signed modules in secure boot instances and then modify grub2-mkconfig to copy the necessary modules into the EFI partition when required by the user's configuration.
  
 
== Benefit to Fedora ==
 
== Benefit to Fedora ==
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-->
 
-->
 
<!-- REQUIRED FOR SYSTEM WIDE CHANGES -->
 
<!-- REQUIRED FOR SYSTEM WIDE CHANGES -->
<b>Disclaimer: Commands assume that tester is root. Secure Boot must be disabled for testing purposes (<code>insmod</code> is forbidden under Secure Boot, for now. This change will help get us to a place where that can be changed). Ensure that the package 'grub2-efi-x64-modules' is installed, and for testing purposes, copy the contents to the EFI partition with <code>cp -r /usr/lib/grub/x86_64-efi/ /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/</code></b>
+
<b>Disclaimer: Commands assume that tester is root. Secure Boot must be disabled for testing purposes (`insmod` is forbidden under Secure Boot, for now. This change will help get us to a place where that can be changed). Ensure that the package 'grub2-efi-x64-modules' is installed, and for testing purposes, copy the contents to the EFI partition with `cp -r /usr/lib/grub/x86_64-efi/ /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/`</b>
  
 
<b>For "verify":</b>
 
<b>For "verify":</b>
  
1. Generate an RSA signing key with <code>gpg --full-generate-key</code>, then export it with <code>gpg --export > pubkey</code> and move it to the EFI partition with <code>mv pubkey /boot/efi/EFI/fedora</code>. You can also export the private key (<code>gpg --export-secret-keys > seckey</code>), but the signing process doesn't require it and gpg will get the key from its own directory.
+
1. Generate an RSA signing key with `gpg --full-generate-key`, then export it with `gpg --export > pubkey` and move it to the EFI partition with `mv pubkey /boot/efi/EFI/fedora`. You can also export the private key (`gpg --export-secret-keys > seckey`), but the signing process doesn't require it as gpg will get the key from its own directory.
  
2. Add "insmod verify," "insmod gcry_rsa," "insmod gcry_sha256" "trust (hd0,gpt1)/efi/fedora/pubkey" (change this based on your environment) and "set check_signatures=enforce" to /etc/grub.d/40_custom
+
2. Add "insmod verify," "insmod gcry_sha256," "insmod gcry_rsa," "trust (hd0,gpt1)/efi/fedora/pubkey" (change this based on your environment) and "set check_signatures=enforce" to /etc/grub.d/40_custom
  
3. Run <code>grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/grub.cfg</code>
+
3. Run `grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/grub.cfg`
  
4. Run <code>export GPG_TTY=$(tty)</code>. Don't ask, apparently something changed in gpg with a recent update.
+
4. Run `export GPG_TTY=$(tty)`. Don't ask, apparently something changed in gpg with a recent update.
  
4. Create a file, /dev/shm/pass, with the key's password and execute: <code>for x in $(find /boot -name "*.cfg" -or -name "*.lst" -or -name "*.mod" -or -name "vmlinuz*" -or -name "initramfs*" -or -name "grubenv"); do gpg --batch --detach-sign --passphrase-fd 0 $x < /dev/shm/pass; done</code>. Then, <code>shred /dev/shm/pass</code>
+
4. Create a file, /dev/shm/pass, with the key's password and execute: `for x in $(find /boot -name "*.cfg" -or -name "*.lst" -or -name "*.mod" -or -name "vmlinuz*" -or -name "initramfs*" -or -name "grubenv"); do gpg --batch --detach-sign --passphrase-fd 0 $x < /dev/shm/pass; done`. Then, `shred /dev/shm/pass`
  
 
5. Reboot. If system starts, backup and remove .sig files. If system does not start this time, change is successful
 
5. Reboot. If system starts, backup and remove .sig files. If system does not start this time, change is successful
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<b>For cryptography modules:</b>
 
<b>For cryptography modules:</b>
  
1. Backup boot partition
+
1. Backup the files in your boot partition
  
2. Run <code>cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sda2 --type luks1</code> (change this based on your environment to /boot's block device)
+
2. Run `cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sda2 --type luks1` (change this based on your environment to /boot's block device)
Note: If filesystem root is also encrypted, it is recommended that the same password be used for boot as for root to decrease the amount of engagement required at start-up. Consider using --iter-time with a low time (in ms), as grub seems single-threaded. Additionally, do not use twofish, serpent (for encryption) or whirlpool
+
Note: If filesystem root is also encrypted, it is recommended that the same password be used for boot as for root to decrease the amount of engagement required at start-up. Consider using --iter-time with a low time in milliseconds (default is 2000ms). Additionally, do not use twofish, serpent (for encryption) or whirlpool, ripemd160 (for hashing) here, as this change does not account for them
(for hashing) here, as this change does not account for them
 
  
3. Open luks container, run <code>mkfs.ext4 /dev/mapper/luks-<your luks UUID></code> and restore backup
+
3. Open luks container with `cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sda2 --type luks1 crypt_boot` (change this to match your environment) and run `mkfs.ext4 /dev/mapper/crypt_boot`, then mount and restore backup
  
4. Add GRUB_ENABLE_CRYPTODISK=y to /etc/default/grub
+
4. Add "GRUB_ENABLE_CRYPTODISK=y" to /etc/default/grub
  
5. Confirm that /etc/fstab has the correct UUID for /boot
+
5. Correct /etc/fstab to the correct UUID for /boot
  
6. Add an entry for the boot container to /etc/crypttab, then run <code>dracut -vf --regenerate-all</code>
+
6. Add an entry for the boot container to /etc/crypttab (i.e. "luks-<your luks UUID> UUID=<your luks UUID> none discard"), then run `dracut -vf --regenerate-all`
  
7. Run <code>grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/grub.cfg</code>
+
7. Run `grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/grub.cfg`
  
 
8. Reboot. Grub should ask for the password created in step 2. If system then starts, change is successful
 
8. Reboot. Grub should ask for the password created in step 2. If system then starts, change is successful

Revision as of 09:53, 15 May 2019

Include several modules in the EFI build of Grub2 for security use-cases

Summary

Include Grub's "verify," "cryptodisk" and "luks" modules in grubx64.efi of the 'grub2-efi-x64' package.


Note: The following dependencies must also be included:

Explicit: "mpi," "gcry_sha1," "procfs" and "archelp"

Implicit: "gcry_sha256," "gcry_rsa" and "gcry_rijndael"

Owner

  • Name: Benjamin Doron
  • Email: benjamin.doron00@gmail.com
  • Release notes owner:

Current status

  • Targeted release: Fedora 31
  • Last updated: 2019-05-15
  • Tracker bug: <will be assigned by the Wrangler>

Detailed Description

Users utilising secure boot functionality on the UEFI platform cannot insert grub modules. Paradoxically, this means that security-conscious users cannot use grub's verify module, or employ (near) full disk encryption using cryptodisk and luks.

The security benefits of signature verification would reach more users if Fedora automated it by incorporating the process into grub2-mkconfig. Similarly, it would be easier to use cryptodisk functionality if it were configurable by anaconda.

For the long-term, to grant flexibility with grub2 modules on secure boot instances, it may be advisable to sign the .mod files in the 'grub2-efi-x64-modules' package, allow inserting of signed modules in secure boot instances and then modify grub2-mkconfig to copy the necessary modules into the EFI partition when required by the user's configuration.

Benefit to Fedora

This change will allow users to gain trust in the integrity of early-launch code either through verification of signatures (particularly useful for initramfs, which is particularly vulnerable to possible offline modification) or encryption of the boot partition.

Scope

  • Proposal owners: Modify grub.macros file to include the above-mentioned modules in the GRUB_MODULES variable (and then send a pull request).
  • Other developers: N/A (not a System Wide Change)
  • Policies and guidelines: N/A (not a System Wide Change)
  • Trademark approval: N/A (not needed for this Change)

Upgrade/compatibility impact

Change only adds modules, so existing users should have no problems.

How To Test

Disclaimer: Commands assume that tester is root. Secure Boot must be disabled for testing purposes (insmod is forbidden under Secure Boot, for now. This change will help get us to a place where that can be changed). Ensure that the package 'grub2-efi-x64-modules' is installed, and for testing purposes, copy the contents to the EFI partition with cp -r /usr/lib/grub/x86_64-efi/ /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/

For "verify":

1. Generate an RSA signing key with gpg --full-generate-key, then export it with gpg --export > pubkey and move it to the EFI partition with mv pubkey /boot/efi/EFI/fedora. You can also export the private key (gpg --export-secret-keys > seckey), but the signing process doesn't require it as gpg will get the key from its own directory.

2. Add "insmod verify," "insmod gcry_sha256," "insmod gcry_rsa," "trust (hd0,gpt1)/efi/fedora/pubkey" (change this based on your environment) and "set check_signatures=enforce" to /etc/grub.d/40_custom

3. Run grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/grub.cfg

4. Run export GPG_TTY=$(tty). Don't ask, apparently something changed in gpg with a recent update.

4. Create a file, /dev/shm/pass, with the key's password and execute: for x in $(find /boot -name "*.cfg" -or -name "*.lst" -or -name "*.mod" -or -name "vmlinuz*" -or -name "initramfs*" -or -name "grubenv"); do gpg --batch --detach-sign --passphrase-fd 0 $x < /dev/shm/pass; done. Then, shred /dev/shm/pass

5. Reboot. If system starts, backup and remove .sig files. If system does not start this time, change is successful

(To recover from a now non-booting system, open the grub terminal and execute set check_signatures=no. The system should then boot, and .sig files can be replaced or regenerated.)


For cryptography modules:

1. Backup the files in your boot partition

2. Run cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sda2 --type luks1 (change this based on your environment to /boot's block device) Note: If filesystem root is also encrypted, it is recommended that the same password be used for boot as for root to decrease the amount of engagement required at start-up. Consider using --iter-time with a low time in milliseconds (default is 2000ms). Additionally, do not use twofish, serpent (for encryption) or whirlpool, ripemd160 (for hashing) here, as this change does not account for them

3. Open luks container with cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sda2 --type luks1 crypt_boot (change this to match your environment) and run mkfs.ext4 /dev/mapper/crypt_boot, then mount and restore backup

4. Add "GRUB_ENABLE_CRYPTODISK=y" to /etc/default/grub

5. Correct /etc/fstab to the correct UUID for /boot

6. Add an entry for the boot container to /etc/crypttab (i.e. "luks-<your luks UUID> UUID=<your luks UUID> none discard"), then run dracut -vf --regenerate-all

7. Run grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/grub.cfg

8. Reboot. Grub should ask for the password created in step 2. If system then starts, change is successful

(If filesystem root is also encrypted, user will be asked for a password twice. This can be mitigated with a keyfile for filesystem root, or use of the clevis package and likely, a tpm.)

User Experience

Users may optionally elect to verify the integrity of boot code either through verification of digital signatures or encryption of the boot partition.

Dependencies

Grub2-efi-x64-modules and grub2-tools-* depend on this package, but require no change.

Contingency Plan

  • Contingency mechanism: (What to do? Who will do it?) Revert the shipped configuration
  • Contingency deadline: Beta freeze
  • Blocks release? N/A (not a System Wide Change)
  • Blocks product? No

Documentation

https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/manual/grub/html_node/Using-digital-signatures.html

https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Dm-crypt/Encrypting_an_entire_system#Encrypted_boot_partition_(GRUB)

Release Notes

Fedora now supports Grub's detached verify and cryptodisk functionality natively, even on secure boot systems.