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== Page Size ==
 
== Page Size ==
  
A useful hardening feature is to have a page in the data segment which you can make read-only after initialization (using <code>mprotect>/code>).  Assuming the data is accessed using PC-relative instructions, there is no way that malicious code can patch it (without calling <code>mprotect</code> again first).  For this to work, that data needs to be aligned on a page boundary, otherwise the <code>protect</code> call might make unrelated variables read-only.  We currently do not encode the page size in the executable.  There are some claims it is possible to guess it from the program header, but that seems to be a bit of a stretch.
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A useful hardening feature is to have a page in the data segment which you can make read-only after initialization (using <code>mprotect</code>).  Assuming the data is accessed using PC-relative instructions, there is no way that malicious code can patch it (without calling <code>mprotect</code> again first).  For this to work, that data needs to be aligned on a page boundary, otherwise the <code>protect</code> call might make unrelated variables read-only.  We currently do not encode the page size in the executable.  There are some claims it is possible to guess it from the program header, but that seems to be a bit of a stretch.
  
 
Similarly, for figuring out if a binary has indeed full RELRO, we need to know if the dynamic linker can actually make the GOT read-only because it does not overlap with data which has to be read-write.  Without explicit page size information, it is not possible to tell whether lack of RELRO due to misalignment is a static linker bug or a missing linker flag.
 
Similarly, for figuring out if a binary has indeed full RELRO, we need to know if the dynamic linker can actually make the GOT read-only because it does not overlap with data which has to be read-write.  Without explicit page size information, it is not possible to tell whether lack of RELRO due to misalignment is a static linker bug or a missing linker flag.
  
 
[[Category:Toolchain/Watermark/Provisional]]
 
[[Category:Toolchain/Watermark/Provisional]]

Revision as of 10:34, 24 October 2016

Page Size

A useful hardening feature is to have a page in the data segment which you can make read-only after initialization (using mprotect). Assuming the data is accessed using PC-relative instructions, there is no way that malicious code can patch it (without calling mprotect again first). For this to work, that data needs to be aligned on a page boundary, otherwise the protect call might make unrelated variables read-only. We currently do not encode the page size in the executable. There are some claims it is possible to guess it from the program header, but that seems to be a bit of a stretch.

Similarly, for figuring out if a binary has indeed full RELRO, we need to know if the dynamic linker can actually make the GOT read-only because it does not overlap with data which has to be read-write. Without explicit page size information, it is not possible to tell whether lack of RELRO due to misalignment is a static linker bug or a missing linker flag.