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dwalsh hello Nov 17 07:14
delhage hi :) Nov 17 07:14
inode0 \o/ Nov 17 07:14
dwalsh Sorry I got carried away at other stuff and forgot to do the class. Nov 17 07:15
zer0c00l lol Nov 17 07:16
dwalsh I am just going to go over the presentation at Nov 17 07:16
dwalsh When I was in college if the Prof was 15 minutes late, we figured the class was cancelled. Nov 17 07:17
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dwalsh So if you are still here, I will go ahead. Nov 17 07:17
*mj0vy is here. Nov 17 07:17
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*zer0c00l is here Nov 17 07:17
delhage I think you made it by one minute ;) Nov 17 07:17
inode0 we would have waited longer for you to show up dwalsh :) Nov 17 07:17
dgrift is here Nov 17 07:18
dwalsh Ok lets start Nov 17 07:18
dwalsh Slide 2 Nov 17 07:18
dwalsh Having a hard time getting setup Nov 17 07:19
delhage whouldn't we turn on the logging? nirik? Nov 17 07:19
zer0c00l what happened to meet bot? Nov 17 07:20
delhage shouldn't* Nov 17 07:20
zer0c00l yeah! Nov 17 07:20
dwalsh Here we go. Nov 17 07:21
dwalsh The hottest thing in Computer shows right now is Virtualization. Nov 17 07:21
dwalsh It seems to be the nervana. Every thing is going to be fixed by virtualization. Nov 17 07:21
dwalsh Red Hat, Microsoft, VMWare Nov 17 07:22
dwalsh and their allies are pushing virtualization Nov 17 07:22
dwalsh Proponents are suggesting that you will get great benefits like Nov 17 07:22
dwalsh Power savings Nov 17 07:23
dwalsh Ease of Maintenance Nov 17 07:23
dwalsh Cost savings in Power, Real Estate Nov 17 07:23
dwalsh Etc Nov 17 07:23
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dwalsh Next slide Nov 17 07:23
dwalsh Before Virtualization Nov 17 07:24
dwalsh We have a pretty good story from a security point of view. Nov 17 07:24
dwalsh If one machine gets compromized, we have isolation Nov 17 07:24
dwalsh based on the network. Nov 17 07:24
dwalsh We have excellent tools to watch for network attacks. Nov 17 07:25
dwalsh Packet analysys, Nov 17 07:25
dwalsh for example Nov 17 07:25
dwalsh And we have good tools like firewalls and SELinux to protect secondary machines from being compromized Nov 17 07:25
dwalsh This is a well understood problem. Nov 17 07:25
dwalsh We have been dealing with this type of attack for many years. Nov 17 07:26
dwalsh Next slide Nov 17 07:26
dwalsh In a virtualized system the network isolation goes away. Nov 17 07:26
dwalsh Since you are running multiple operating systems on a machine at once. Nov 17 07:27
dwalsh In Linux KVM each one of these virtual machines is one or more processes running on the host machine. Nov 17 07:27
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dwalsh I have talked to desktop virtualization people who are talking about 100-1000 VMs running simultaneously on the same machine. Nov 17 07:28
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dwalsh Next slide. Nov 17 07:28
dwalsh What can possibly go wrong..... Nov 17 07:28
dwalsh Flawed Hypervisor. Nov 17 07:28
dwalsh Flawed hypervisor: Nov 17 07:29
dwalsh Malicious guest breaks out, attacks other guests or host. Now all of your systems are Nov 17 07:29
dwalsh susceptible to a broken hypervisor, no Network to protect you. Nov 17 07:29
dwalsh If you rely on standard unix protections. Like UID, currently virtual machines are running as root. Nov 17 07:30
dwalsh But they are moving to run as the UID qemu? Nov 17 07:30
dwalsh Is this better? Nov 17 07:30
dwalsh Maybe/Maybe not. Nov 17 07:30
dwalsh If you run all the virtual machines as the same UID you might protect the host machine but you will not protect the virtual machines from each other. Nov 17 07:31
dwalsh Next slide Nov 17 07:31
dwalsh So lets talk about Hypervisor Vulnerabilities Nov 17 07:32
dwalsh They are not Theoretical Nov 17 07:32
dwalsh It is an evolving field. Nov 17 07:32
dwalsh If you went to a Black Hat convention, this is one of the biggest topics being discussed. Nov 17 07:32
dwalsh Why? Nov 17 07:32
dwalsh Remember the Jesse James quote about Why he robbed the banks. Nov 17 07:33
dwalsh That is where the money is. Nov 17 07:33
dwalsh There are potentially huge payoffs Nov 17 07:33
dwalsh Finally Xen has already been compromised Nov 17 07:34
dwalsh next slide Nov 17 07:34
dwalsh The paper referenced in this slide explains how hackers broke out of a xen virtual machine to take over a RHEL5 box. Nov 17 07:34
dwalsh And if you notice the highlight, they explain how they got around SELinux :^( Nov 17 07:35
dwalsh The sad part is I knew the SELinux protections on Xen were of limited value when I wrote them. Nov 17 07:35
dwalsh The problem was when we were writing RHEL5 and Xen policy we required the administrators to label disk/images with a label of xen_image_t. Nov 17 07:36
dwalsh So if you stored you images in /var/lib/xem/images they would get the correct label xen_image_t and the xen_t would be able to manage them. Nov 17 07:37
dwalsh BUT... Nov 17 07:37
dwalsh If you wanted to setup a xen image on a physical disk node using lvm or iscsi. Nov 17 07:37
dwalsh You would have to set up the labeling on the node to be xen_image_t. Nov 17 07:38
dwalsh People using xen like this were regularly hitting this problem that xen_t was not able to write to fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file Nov 17 07:38
dwalsh Which is the default label of physical disk device nodes. Nov 17 07:38
dwalsh Xen and ultimately RHEL Management decided that SELinux was breaking Xen and we had to allow this to get the product complete. Nov 17 07:39
dwalsh Well I relented and allowed xend_t to write fixed_disk_device_t and this is how the compromized xen person broke out of SELinux confinement. Nov 17 07:40
dwalsh If I can write to the physical disk label I can write anywhere on any disk. Nov 17 07:40
dwalsh I vowed we would not do this with kvm virtualizaion. Nov 17 07:41
dwalsh More on that later. Nov 17 07:41
dwalsh Next slide Nov 17 07:41
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dwalsh This slide shows what happens when a hypervisor is compromized Nov 17 07:42
dwalsh The virtual machine in this picture has a web app problem that allows the cracker to get full control of the machine. Nov 17 07:42
dwalsh The cracker now figures out that he is running in a virtual machine and uses the hypervisor compromize to attack the host. Nov 17 07:43
dwalsh Finally he also attacks other virtual machine on the host. Nov 17 07:43
dwalsh Realize that the other virtual machines do not even need to be running. Nov 17 07:43
dwalsh The Cracker could simply attack the other virtual images that this host machine can write too. Nov 17 07:44
dwalsh libguestfs makes this much easier... Nov 17 07:44
dwalsh next slide Nov 17 07:44
dwalsh This is the Who is the weakest link slide. Nov 17 07:44
dwalsh Red Hat prides itself on being the most secure Main Stream Operating System. Nov 17 07:45
dwalsh Linux prides itself as being the most secure Operating System Nov 17 07:45
dwalsh But now we are going to run Red Hat, Microsoft, Solaris, Suse ... Nov 17 07:46
dwalsh All on the same host. Nov 17 07:46
dwalsh Any one of these can get compromised and then attack the hypervisor. Nov 17 07:46
dwalsh So you are only as secure as the Weakest OS that you are running in your host Nov 17 07:47
dwalsh next slide Nov 17 07:47
dwalsh Now lets look at Cloud Nov 17 07:47
dwalsh Amazone, Google and hundreds of smaller entities are telling cloud is the future. Nov 17 07:48
dwalsh Destroy your datacenters and just let us run them in the cloud. Nov 17 07:48
dwalsh Reminds me of a childrens story Nov 17 07:48
dwalsh Next slide Nov 17 07:48
dwalsh Hansel and Gretyl Nov 17 07:48
dwalsh Nice house on the outside, but beware of whats inside Nov 17 07:49
dwalsh next slide Nov 17 07:49
dwalsh My view of cloud Nov 17 07:49
dwalsh Why should I trust Amazon? Google? Nov 17 07:49
dwalsh next slide Nov 17 07:49
dwalsh You do not know what virtual machine will be running next to you. Nov 17 07:50
dwalsh Just to highlight this. What happens if Coke and Pepsi get the same host? Nov 17 07:50
dwalsh BTW I have given this presentation before and usually marketing makes me say Soda Company A and B Nov 17 07:50
dwalsh But I think you get the point. Nov 17 07:51
dwalsh If you have valuable information and you put it out on the cloud. Nov 17 07:51
dwalsh You need to worry about the cloud company being secure and you have to worry about every virtual machine that runs with your vm. Nov 17 07:51
dwalsh In the cloud case, crackers do not need to break into one of the virtual machines. Nov 17 07:52
dwalsh If they know about a hypervisor vulnerability all they need to do is pay amazon for a host machine with root access and Nov 17 07:52
dwalsh start it up. Nov 17 07:52
dwalsh Break through the Hypervisor Vulnerabiltiy and see what virtual machines you can attack. Nov 17 07:53
dwalsh Sounds like fun... Nov 17 07:53
dwalsh Next slide Nov 17 07:53
dwalsh Enter SELinux.. Nov 17 07:53
dwalsh As I have written before SELinux is all about labeling. Nov 17 07:53
dwalsh It puts labels on processes and labels on objects like files and nodes. Nov 17 07:54
dwalsh It then writes rules that say how a process label can interact with a file label. Nov 17 07:54
dwalsh Or other process labels. Nov 17 07:54
dwalsh So Processes get labels Nov 17 07:54
dwalsh In Linux/KVM virtual machines are just processes. Nov 17 07:55
dwalsh Interesting Nov 17 07:55
dwalsh Files/Devices get labels Nov 17 07:55
dwalsh In Linux/KVM Virtual Images are stored in files of physical devices Nov 17 07:55
dwalsh So they get labels Nov 17 07:55
dwalsh So SELinux and Linux/KVM are a great match. Nov 17 07:56
dwalsh So you can label guest process as A and an image file as Nov 17 07:56
dwalsh B and write rules that say Process A can Read/Write File B. Similarly I could create a Nov 17 07:56
dwalsh separate guest labeled C and a separate image labeled D, and a rule that says Nov 17 07:56
dwalsh Process C can Read/Write File D. Nov 17 07:56
dwalsh But if there is no rule that allows process A to access image D, the kernel will prevent Nov 17 07:56
dwalsh process A from touching image D, even if the process A is running as root. Nov 17 07:56
dwalsh next slide Nov 17 07:57
dwalsh svirt in a nutshell is to isolate guest images using MAC (SELinux) to contain hypervisor breaches. Nov 17 07:57
dwalsh But what about the xen problem we discussed earlier. Nov 17 07:58
dwalsh Sys admins do not want to do all this labeling. They don't understand it and they get it wrong. Dumb Humans. Nov 17 07:58
dwalsh With svirt we allow the computer to do the labeling Nov 17 07:58
dwalsh sVirt is a component of libvirtd Nov 17 07:59
dwalsh libvirtd knows all the files involved with a virtual machine Nov 17 07:59
dwalsh Since it starts the virtual machines Nov 17 07:59
dwalsh it can label all of the content Nov 17 07:59
dwalsh before starting the virtual machine Nov 17 07:59
dwalsh It can relabel the content when the virtual machine completes Nov 17 08:00
dwalsh We can take the human element out of the equation. Nov 17 08:00
dwalsh SELinux simplified. Nov 17 08:00
dwalsh Next slide Nov 17 08:00
dwalsh Libvirt Dynamic Labeling. Nov 17 08:00
dwalsh This slide is probably the most difficult to understand. Nov 17 08:01
dwalsh In RHEL5 xen policy we are basically protecting the host from the virtual machines. Nov 17 08:01
dwalsh We wrote rules that says xend_t can read/write xen_image_t but it can not read user_home_t. Nov 17 08:02
dwalsh So a compromised xen could not read the hosts home directories. Nov 17 08:02
dwalsh But Since it can r/w xen_image_t it could r/w another xen_image_t Nov 17 08:02
dwalsh So Pepsi virtual machine can read the coke virtual image and steal it secrets. Nov 17 08:03
dwalsh Not good. Nov 17 08:03
dwalsh We wanted to define a policy where the processes would run with the exact same privs Nov 17 08:03
dwalsh but not be able to interact with each other. Nov 17 08:03
dwalsh So we needed almost the same labels with a slight variation. Nov 17 08:04
dwalsh ENTER MCS Nov 17 08:04
dwalsh MCS stands for Multi-Category-Security Nov 17 08:04
dwalsh It is the fourth field of the SELinux label Nov 17 08:04
dwalsh User:Role:Type:MCS (Or MLS) Nov 17 08:04
dwalsh The fourth field had been added to support MLS - Multi-Level-Security for RHEL5 Nov 17 08:05
dwalsh This is the stuff that handles labels like TopSecret and Unclassified. Nov 17 08:05
dwalsh But we did not want MLS on Targeted policy. Nov 17 08:05
dwalsh We still wanted to use the fourth field for something Nov 17 08:06
dwalsh But while people have experimented with using it for things like PatientRecord or CompanyConfidential Nov 17 08:06
dwalsh It never got on. Nov 17 08:06
dwalsh And there were some problems with its design. Nov 17 08:06
dwalsh Most SELinux developers believe you should use the Type field for this kind of labeling. Nov 17 08:07
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dwalsh Anyways we had the capability of using the fourth field, for isolation. Nov 17 08:07
dwalsh We decided to generate a random mcs field like s0:c134, c514 Nov 17 08:07
dwalsh And use this to label the virtual machine Nov 17 08:08
dwalsh Virtual machines get random labels like Nov 17 08:08
delhage why 2 categories like that? Nov 17 08:08
dwalsh system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c134,c514 Nov 17 08:08
dgrift else you have only room for 1024 unique machines Nov 17 08:08
delhage makes sense, thanks Nov 17 08:09
dwalsh 2 categories gives us 1024*1024 combinations Nov 17 08:09
*delhage nods Nov 17 08:09
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dwalsh But really we need to devide by 2 and we don't allow them to be the same Nov 17 08:09
dwalsh So we can run 1024*1024/2 - 1024 Nov 17 08:10
dwalsh Virtual machines Nov 17 08:10
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dwalsh And these are currently unigue to the host Nov 17 08:10
dwalsh So until we approach 500,000 Nov 17 08:10
dwalsh simultanious vms Nov 17 08:10
dwalsh 2 is enough Nov 17 08:10
dwalsh But we can up it to 3, 4... Nov 17 08:10
dwalsh So in dynamic mode Nov 17 08:11
dwalsh libvirt generates a semi random MCS label and makes sure it is unique Nov 17 08:11
dwalsh Then it labels the virtual machine Nov 17 08:11
dwalsh using this label Nov 17 08:11
dwalsh system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:MCS1 Nov 17 08:12
dwalsh And starts the virtual machine as Nov 17 08:12
dwalsh system_u:object_r:svirt_t:MCS1 Nov 17 08:12
dwalsh Which allows the virtual machine to read its image file Nov 17 08:12
dwalsh When it starts a second virtual machine Nov 17 08:13
dwalsh it picks another MCS label Nov 17 08:13
dwalsh MCS2 Nov 17 08:13
dwalsh using this label Nov 17 08:13
dwalsh system_u:object_r:svirt_t:MCS2 Nov 17 08:13
dwalsh system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:MCS2 Nov 17 08:13
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dwalsh Now svirt_t:MCS1 is prevented from R/W svirt_image_t:MCS2 Nov 17 08:14
dwalsh So Pepsi is prevented from attacking Coke. Nov 17 08:14
dwalsh libvirt supports 4 labels Nov 17 08:14
dwalsh svirt_image_t:MCS for Unshared content Nov 17 08:14
dwalsh Shared Read/Only content like cdroms Nov 17 08:15
dwalsh virt_content:s0 Nov 17 08:15
dwalsh Shared R/W content Nov 17 08:15
dwalsh svirt_image_t:s0 Nov 17 08:15
dwalsh And a label virt_image_t:s0 which no virtual machines can read or write Nov 17 08:15
dwalsh This is the label all virtual content gets when the virtual machine is not running. Nov 17 08:16
dgrift hoe would you apply a different label? virsh-edit? Nov 17 08:16
dwalsh Yes coming to that Nov 17 08:16
dgrift ok Nov 17 08:16
dwalsh next slide Nov 17 08:16
dwalsh This slide show in picture that how this works Nov 17 08:17
delhage is the slide wrong or is R/W shared content svirt_t:s0? Nov 17 08:17
dwalsh The slide is wrong Nov 17 08:17
delhage ok Nov 17 08:17
dwalsh svirt_t:s0 is a process label. Nov 17 08:17
dwalsh I mean to fix this. Nov 17 08:17
dwalsh In this slide the virtual machine svirt_t:MCS1 is shown being compromised Nov 17 08:18
dwalsh The Hypervisor has a compromise Nov 17 08:18
dwalsh and the hacker is breaking out and attempting to attack the HOST. Nov 17 08:19
dwalsh But SELinux steps in and blocks the attack Nov 17 08:19
dwalsh since svirt_t:MCS is not allowed to read fixed_disk_device_t or user_home_t Nov 17 08:19
dwalsh Also if svirt_t:MCS1 attempts to attack svirt_t:MCS2 or svirt_image_t:MCS2 it will be blocked by SELinux Nov 17 08:20
dwalsh One think I have demoed is to start an virtual machine using libvirt and then go in with chcon -l and change the MCS label. Nov 17 08:20
dwalsh Now watch the virtual machine slowly blow up. Nov 17 08:21
dwalsh Your log files will also fill up with AVC messages. Nov 17 08:21
dwalsh next slide Nov 17 08:21
dwalsh We have talked about dynamic labeling but what about people wanting to use their own policy Nov 17 08:22
dwalsh or use MLS? Nov 17 08:22
dwalsh MLS does not like the idea of content dynamically changing its security level. Nov 17 08:22
dwalsh MLS works real hard to prevent this. Nov 17 08:23
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dwalsh We wanted this technology to be used by MLS type people so we added static labeling. Nov 17 08:23
dwalsh In a static label environment the administrator is required to label the content Nov 17 08:24
dwalsh and libvirt will NOT change it. Nov 17 08:24
dwalsh If I have a virtual machine that needs to run at TopSecret I label the image as TopSecret and then tell libvirt to run the process at TopSecret Nov 17 08:25
dwalsh This does not give you the isolation that you get using Dynamic. Nov 17 08:25
dwalsh Meaning a compromised svirt_t:TopSecret can attack other svirt_t:TopSecret processes. Nov 17 08:25
dwalsh But in MLS this is ok. (Theoretically) Nov 17 08:26
dwalsh You can also run Static labels and Dynamic Labels at the same time. Nov 17 08:26
dwalsh So you could set up one virtual machine to always run with one hard coded label and have the rest of the virtual machines running dynamically. Nov 17 08:27
dwalsh Not sure if this is a valid use case but it will work. Nov 17 08:27
dwalsh libvirt would not guarantee that the dynamic label would not match a static label though Nov 17 08:27
dwalsh So your static label better have a different type or more then two fields in the MCS label. Nov 17 08:28
dwalsh Next Slide Nov 17 08:28
Josh_Borke is that a planned enhancement? Nov 17 08:28
dwalsh Don't know. Nov 17 08:28
dwalsh I need to see if this is a valid use case Nov 17 08:28
dgrift what if you want it? Nov 17 08:28
dwalsh This slide show Virt Manager Nov 17 08:28
dgrift you can expect to svirt to know Nov 17 08:29
dgrift cant* sorry Nov 17 08:29
dwalsh We are not analyzing the list of static virtual machines to see if the MCS portion of the label overlaps the MCS range, but I guess theoretically this is possible. Nov 17 08:29
dwalsh A lot of work and not likely much value. Nov 17 08:30
dwalsh Anyways this slide show the gui that you could specify a static label Nov 17 08:30
dwalsh It also shows you could pick different security mechanisms then SELinux in svirt. Nov 17 08:31
dwalsh Like None. Nov 17 08:31
dwalsh Which will disable the setting of the labels Nov 17 08:31
dwalsh And I think Suse has hacked up an AppArmour way of doing something similar Nov 17 08:31
dwalsh NextSlide Nov 17 08:32
dwalsh This slide shows the static labeled virtual machines running in MLS mode. Nov 17 08:32
dwalsh Realize that while you can run MLS environment using this mechanism. Currently there is no Common Criteria to cover this use case. Nov 17 08:32
dwalsh The government will probably require a Virtualization Common Criteria before it would accept it. Nov 17 08:33
dwalsh This is something Red Hat and its partners are investigating. Nov 17 08:33
dwalsh Next Slide Nov 17 08:34
dwalsh One suggested Future Enhancement is to allow users to specify alternative types Nov 17 08:34
dwalsh For example svirt_web_t Nov 17 08:34
dwalsh Which would allow the virtual machine to use only the http ports. Nov 17 08:34
dwalsh You can imaging you could run a windows virtual machine on a RHEL5 box and even if the virtual machine became compromised Nov 17 08:35
dwalsh SELinux could prevent it becoming a spam bot. Nov 17 08:35
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dgrift and also provide the protection that the mcs method brings? Nov 17 08:35
dwalsh Yes it would still be dynamic labeling Nov 17 08:36
dgrift then why not skip mcs because te seems more flexible Nov 17 08:36
dwalsh But I believe iptables would give you better confinement and more fine grained control. Nov 17 08:36
dwalsh Although the SELinux work is easier. Nov 17 08:36
dwalsh mcs gives you isolation between virtual machines Nov 17 08:37
dwalsh If you run two svirt_web_t you want them isolated Nov 17 08:37
dgrift well doesnt the te method do this as well Nov 17 08:37
dgrift true Nov 17 08:37
dgrift but you can do web1 web2 Nov 17 08:37
dwalsh Yes if you want to write policy you could write multiple domains Nov 17 08:38
dwalsh But when the domains need the exact same access Nov 17 08:38
dwalsh But isolated you end up with an explosion of policy Nov 17 08:38
dgrift attributes Nov 17 08:38
dgrift true Nov 17 08:38
dwalsh That is the end of the svirt Nov 17 08:38
dgrift but also more optional Nov 17 08:38
dgrift thanks Nov 17 08:38
dwalsh Talk questions Nov 17 08:38
dwalsh svirt is in F11 and F12 Nov 17 08:39
dwalsh It is potentially going to be back ported to RHEL5.6 Nov 17 08:39
dwalsh It will be in RHEL6 Nov 17 08:40
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dwalsh It is in the upstream project so others can replace the SELinux svirt module with other security mechanisms. Nov 17 08:40
dwalsh Oh one last point. Nov 17 08:40
dwalsh When you are deciding on a Virtualization technology. Nov 17 08:40
dwalsh Always ask the vendo? Nov 17 08:41
dwalsh What mechanism do you use to mitigate a Hypvervisor Vulnerabiltiy Nov 17 08:41
dwalsh If they tell you their code is too good, Laugh at them Nov 17 08:41
dwalsh All Code is broken. And Crackers will find a way. Nov 17 08:42
dwalsh Thanks for listening. If anyone is still out there... Nov 17 08:42
rprice dwalsh: Thanks ;) Nov 17 08:42
dgrift thanks again Nov 17 08:42
inode0 yes, thanks a lot for doing this dwalsh Nov 17 08:42
dwalsh Or I guess it should be thanks for reading. Nov 17 08:42
delhage thanks Nov 17 08:42
*inode0 suspects some of us could hear you Nov 17 08:43
Josh_Borke dwalsh: thanks Nov 17 08:45
dwalsh Does this get archived somewhere? Nov 17 08:45
zer0c00l dwalsh: thanks :) Nov 17 08:45
inode0 when backported to RHEL5 will sVirt be a KVM only enhancement or will it apply to Xen too? Nov 17 08:46
dgrift usually Nov 17 08:46
zer0c00l dwalsh: yeah Nov 17 08:46
dgrift but i dunno if it currently logged Nov 17 08:46
delhage I can't see how it could be applied to xen? Nov 17 08:46
dwalsh kvm only, although I think you can run xen images within qemu out of libvirt Nov 17 08:46
delhage ok Nov 17 08:46
dgrift The_4_key_causes_of_SELinux_errors_(20090503_Classroom) Nov 17 08:47
dwalsh I might do a talk on sandboxing next month Nov 17 08:47
dwalsh My fingers are exhausted. :^) Nov 17 08:47
inode0 thanks again Nov 17 08:48
Josh_Borke svirt is pretty exciting, especially that it is almost invisible Nov 17 08:48

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